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Abstract - The Savannah River National Laboratory’s (SRNL) Weather INformation and Display (WIND) System 
was used to provide meteorological and atmospheric modeling/consequence assessment support to state and local 
agencies following the collision of two Norfolk Southern freight trains on the morning of January 6, 2005.  This 
collision resulted in the release of several toxic chemicals to the environment, including chlorine.  The dense and 
highly toxic cloud of chlorine gas that formed in the vicinity of the accident was responsible for nine fatalities and 
injuries to more than five hundred others. Transport model results depicting the forecast path of the ongoing 
release were made available to emergency managers in the county’s Unified Command Center shortly after SRNL 
received a request for assistance.  Support continued over the ensuing two days of the active response.    The 
SRNL also provided weather briefings and transport/consequence assessment model results to responders from 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental control (SCDHEC), the Savannah River Site’s (SRS) 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), DOE Headquarters, and hazmat teams dispatched from the SRS. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
On January 6, 2005 at approximately 2:40 AM, 
two Norfolk Southern freight trains collided in the 
town of Graniteville, SC, resulting in the rupture of 
rail cars transporting liquefied chlorine and other 
industrial chemicals.  The subsequent discharge of 
chlorine quickly produced a dense airborne cloud of 
toxic gas and aerosols that spread throughout 
property occupied by a textile mill and into adjacent 
areas of town, resulting in the deaths of nine 
individuals, mainly mill workers, and injuries to more 
than 500 others.  The threat of a rupture to additional 
tankers of chlorine that were damaged in the accident 
resulted in closure of businesses and the relocation of 
more than 5000 residents for up to nine days, as 
crews worked to dispose of the remaining 
inventories.   Hundreds of emergency workers from 
local volunteer fire departments, Aiken County 
sheriff and emergency management offices, the 
Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site, and 
state and Federal agencies responded to the event. 
The town of Graniteville is located in west-central 
South Carolina a few kilometers (km) west of Aiken, 
SC and approximately 10 km north of DOE’s 
Savannah River Site (SRS) and the SRNL. 
 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
The SRNL’s Atmospheric Technologies Group 
has developed automated atmospheric transport and 
consequence assessment assets in support of the SRS 
emergency response program for more than 30 years.  
In 1996, the ATG initiated the establishment of 
mutual aid agreements with emergency management 
agencies in five counties surrounding the SRS, 
including Aiken County1.  These agreements 
delineated three areas of technical support: (1) 
assistance in establishing meteorological monitoring 
stations, linked to the existing SRS meteorological 
monitoring network, in areas with potential for 
generating airborne hazards; (2) provide custom 
software for use by the county in real-time 
consequence assessment; and (3) provide technical 
assistance to the county’s emergency managers 
during a real-time response.  
 
II.A. Overview of Current SRS Resources for 
Consequence Assessment 
 
The primary SRNL resource used to conduct 
consequence assessment for emergency response is 
the Weather INformation and Display (WIND) 
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System2. The backbone of the WIND System is a 
cluster of UNIX workstations, located in the SRS 
central computer facility, that gather data from the 
regional network of meteorological monitoring 
stations (mesonet) and archives these data in a 
relational database. Every 15 minutes, meteorological 
observations are extracted from the database and 
downloaded, along with forecast data from 
operational runs of a prognostic mesoscale model, to 
desktop PCs.  Consequence assessment models 
residing on the PCs can then be run with the current 
observations and forecasts to generate real-time 
predictions of downwind transport and associated 
hazards.  
 
 II.B.  WIND System Components 
 
Meteorological Measurements.   The mesonet of 
meteorological monitoring stations currently 
incorporated into WIND System operations is 
illustrated in Fig. 1.  Towers located adjacent to each 
of the SRS's eight major operations areas are 
instrumented to measure winds, temperature, and 
moisture at an elevation of 60 meters above ground 
level.  A ninth tower located near the center of the 
SRS collects similar data at four levels through a 
height of 60 meters.  The ATG also operates 
instrumentation on a TV tower facility located near 
the SRS which provides measurements of wind, 
temperature, and moisture at several levels through 
330 meters.  Every 15 minutes, field observations are 
transmitted to the UNIX workstation cluster and 
archived, as noted above. The mutual aid agreements 
led of 1996 to installation of an additional four 
monitoring stations in Augusta/Richmond Co. (GA). 
Measurements of wind and temperature at these four 
sites are collected at a single level with heights 
ranging from 10 to 60 meters above ground.  
 
Measurements from the regional mesonet are 
supplemented by Southeastern U.S. surface 
observations and upper-air soundings from the 
National Weather Service (NWS). The NWS 
information is integrated into the WIND System in 
real-time via satellite transmission from a private 
sector meteorological service. 
 
Meteorological Forecasts.   The SRNL has 
configured a prognostic atmospheric model, the 
Regional Atmospheric Modeling System (RAMS), to 
generate routine three-dimensional forecasts of 
meteorological conditions throughout the Central 
Savannah River area and much of the Southeast U.S. 
Detailed 8-hour forecasts of wind speed, direction, 
turbulence and other meteorological variables are 
generated every 3 hours for a region 
encompassing the Central Savannah River area; 24-
hour forecasts for an area that includes much of 
Georgia and South Carolina are produced every 12 
hours. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  SRS Regional Monitoring Network. 
 
  WSRC-MS-2005-00612 
  October 2005 
   
 3 
 
 
 
Atmospheric Transport and Consequence 
Assessment Models.  A suite of transport and 
diffusion models are available for assessing 
consequences of hazardous materials released to the 
environment.  These models are tailored to support a 
broad range of assessment needs during mainly the 
early and intermediate phase of response.  Two of 
these models were used during the Graniteville 
response.   
 
· Puff/Plume is a segmented trajectory Gaussian 
dispersion model that provides an initial, reasonably 
conservative estimate of potential downwind hazards 
from a chemical or radiological release.  Puff or 
plume release trajectories are constructed for up to 12 
hours of observed and forecast winds with results 
available in less than a minute. Output can also be 
exported for use with geographic information system 
software.  
 
· The Lagrangian Particle Dispersion Model 
(LPDM) provides highly refined transport and 
dispersion analyses on local to regional scales.  
LPDM fully utilizes three-dimensional winds forecast 
by RAMS to account for complex wind patterns due 
to the effects of terrain or other mesoscale 
atmospheric phenomena. Although primarily 
configured to calculate dose and deposition for 
radiological releases, LPDM can be used to simulate 
dispersion of any passive contaminant.   
 
III. SRNL SUPPORT DURING THE 
GRANITEVILLE RESPONSE 
 
III.A.  Summary of Prevailing Meteorological 
Conditions Affecting the Release 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of meteorological 
conditions observed from the WIND System regional 
mesonet at the time of the accident.  The south to 
southwest wind that was observed throughout the 
mesonet and at NWS stations across the region was 
the result of a clockwise flow around surface high 
pressure system centered off the southeast U. S. 
coast.  Several aspects of the meteorological 
observations at the time of the accident through the 
remaining pre-dawn hours are believed to be 
significant: 
 
(1)  The uniform nature of observed wind direction 
and speed across all stations in the mesonet 
suggested that synoptic scale pressure gradients 
were, in general, sufficient to overcome possible 
microscale flows driven by local terrain. This 
provided the SRNL response team greater 
confidence that the regional wind observations 
were reasonably representative of conditions in 
the Graniteville area. 
 
(2)  Surface wind speeds and turbulence were more 
pronounced than is often observed in the early 
morning hours. In fact, measured values of 
turbulence intensity suggested an atmospheric 
stability that varied between neutral and weakly 
stable.  
 
These conditions are believed to have been 
sufficient to cause some turbulent mixing and steady 
erosion of contaminant along the periphery of the 
dense cloud that formed immediately after the crash 
and tank rupture, with subsequent passive transport 
of chlorine gas toward less populated areas to the 
north-northeast of Graniteville.  By dawn, visual 
reports from television broadcasts appeared to 
indicate that most of the initially compact dense 
cloud had been flushed from the shallow valley in 
which Graniteville is located. 
 
TABLE I.  Synopsis of Meteorological Conditions 
Observed from the SRNL Mesonet, between 3 AM 
and 6 AM, January 6, 2005 
 
Wind Direction 
(from): South-southwest 
Wind speed: 7 to10 mph (at 60m) 2 to 4 mph (surface) 
Temperature: 52oF to 56oF 
Relative Humidity: 92% to 98% 
Atmospheric 
Stability: P-G Class E and D 
 
 
III.B. Overview of SRNL Support Activities 
 
Consultations with Aiken County EMA began 
around 7 AM on the morning of January 6.  Initially, 
the most significant challenge for the SRNL response 
team was development of a source term that would 
provide an adequate basis for reassessing protective 
action measures.  Aiken County officials reported 
that the accident resulted in breaches to rail cars 
containing chlorine, sodium hydroxide, and cresol. 
All subsequent assessments then focused on chlorine 
as by far the most volatile, and hence, the most 
significant of the three substances with respect to 
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potential airborne hazards.  Furthermore, based on 
reports of injuries and possible fatalities occurring 
during the pre-dawn hours, the breach to the chlorine 
tanker was believed to have resulted in a rapid initial 
discharge of most of the contents, followed by an 
ongoing residual release.  These assumptions were 
supported by television reports from the scene in 
which no significant venting or notable reductions in 
visibility could be observed.  The initial assessment 
was based on a modest, and believed reasonably 
conservative, ongoing release of 60 pounds per min 
(lbs/min)  
 
The first Puff/Plume transport model calculation, 
shown as Fig. 1, was posted to an external web site 
for access by officials at Aiken County’s Unified 
Command Center around 8 am.  Results showed that 
predicted downwind concentrations greater than the 
protective action threshold of 3 parts per million 
(ppm) (ERPG-2) extended no more than 1 mile 
downwind of the accident site.  Discussions 
continued through the morning with Aiken County 
EMA and with representatives from SCDHEC to 
begin evaluating the appropriateness of the initial 
calculation and refine the initial assumptions on 
source term.  Unsubstantiated reports indicated odors 
had been noted by motorists along Interstate 20, 
approximately 20 km north of the incident; however, 
SCDHEC reported no evidence of detectable levels 
of chlorine in areas downwind of the immediate 
incident scene after daylight.  This provided the 
SRNL assessment team increased confidence that the 
chosen default release rate was reasonably bounding.  
 
By 9AM, results were available from an LPDM 
simulation of downwind transport using RAMS 
forecasts of local winds.  The RAMS forecasts for the 
Graniteville area showed winds that were consistent 
with the regional observations and indicated 
persistence of the south-southwest wind throughout 
the day (Fig. 3). Wind observations during the day 
verified this RAMS forecast.  Animation of LPDM 
results based on the RAMS forecast showed a 
corresponding north-northeast transport of the   
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Initial Puff/Plume prediction provided Aiken Co. EMA and South Carolina DHEC for  
the ongoing residual release of chlorine form the Graniteville site. 
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Fig. 3.  Initial LPDM results indicating a forecast of persistent north-northeast transport from the 
Graniteville site. 
 
 
residual chlorine release that would remain west of 
more densely populated areas near the city of Aiken. 
 
The SRNL team continued to provide ongoing 
support as follows: 
 
· Updates of Puff/Plume consequence assessment 
model output using current meteorological 
conditions, posted to the external web site for 
use by Aiken County and SCDHEC 
approximately every 2 hours.  
 
· Briefings for local and state officials on 
consequence modeling results and forecasts of 
meteorological conditions expected for the 
upcoming 12-24 hour period. 
 
Puff/Plume model results were also supplied to 
core staff in the SRS Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC), and subsequently forwarded to DOE 
Headquarters EOC and to the DOE liaison with the 
Department of Homeland Security. 
 
By midday on January 7, responders at the 
incident scene began to plan recovery actions for the 
ruptured tanker as well as for at least one additional 
chlorine tanker that had been damaged but not 
believed to have been ruptured.  One disposition 
alternative was to physically lift the damaged tankers 
from the wreckage and remove them from the scene.  
Due to concern that such actions could result in an 
additional catastrophic rupture, Aiken County 
requested SRNL to estimate possible downwind 
consequences resulting from the postulated release of 
the entire contents of the tanker.  
 
Puff/Plume results for this scenario, using 
meteorological conditions anticipated for that 
afternoon, showed an area of potentially life 
threatening effects (greater than the ERPG-3 
concentration of 20 ppm) to a distance of 5 km from 
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the crash site and potentially irreversible severe 
effects (greater than the ERPG-2 concentration of 3 
ppm) to a distance of more than 20 km from the site.  
Furthermore winds had shifted to a direction that 
would transport the contaminant more toward the 
City of Aiken and impact a nearby hospital and other 
sensitive receptors. Model results for this scenario 
were posted to the external web site and provided to 
Aiken County as a GIS layer for display on the 
Unified Command Center mapping system.  These 
results led to a decision to defer recovery actions 
involving movement of the damaged tankers. 
Eventually, teams were able to reach the tanker in 
place and were able to siphon the remaining chlorine 
inventory onto undamaged tankers that were brought 
to the scene.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The SRNL’s WIND System, a real-time 
consequence assessment resource for emergency 
response, performed as designed to provide timely 
support to Aiken County and State of South Carolina 
officials responding the Norfolk Southern rail 
accident in Graniteville, SC. Results were used to 
reassess the appropriateness of initial protective 
actions for the surrounding community and to plan 
incident scene recovery actions. The value of 
SRNL’s support to local emergency managers was 
noted in subsequent newspaper reports3.   
 
Furthermore, experience gained from the 
Graniteville response clearly demonstrates that 
local/regional consequence assessment assets can 
play a valuable role during hazardous material 
incidents of national significance by providing nearly 
full-time, customized support targeted directly to 
local decision makers.   
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